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LIST OF ALL PARTIES
Although several parties participated in various stages at the trial level,
Plaintiff submits that the only parties subject to this appeal are Plaintiff Alvey
Development Corporation and Defendants Van Mackelprang and Jamie Rae
Mackelprang.
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NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS AND JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Defendants appeal from an Order Denying Motions for New Trial dated
September 29, 2000, issued by the Honorable K. L. Mclff, Sixth Judicial District
Court in and for Kane County, State of Utah.
Plaintiff cross-appeals from that same Order.
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)0), the
case having been transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Utah Supreme
Court.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Was the trial court correct in ruling that the 1997 transfer of an

undivided one-half interest in the westerly 60 feet of the 50-foot strip gave Plaintiff
an "undisputavle (sic) physical abutment" between the 16.5-foot prescriptive
easement and Plaintiffs property? See R. at 820, Finding # 37.
2.

Did the reservation of the 60-foot easement by Kanab Creek

Ranchos, Inc., create a valid easement? See Order beginning at R. 803,
Judgment beginning at R. 828, and Order beginning at R. 879.
3.

Is the 60-foot easement created by Kanab Creek Ranchos, Inc.,

transferable? See Order beginning at R. 803, Judgment beginning at R. 828, and
Order beginning at R. 879.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
Plaintiff does not contest the trial court's findings of fact, only its
conclusions of law. The question of whether or not an easement exists is a
conclusion of law. Potter v. Chadaz. 1999 UT App 095, 977 P.2d 533. Plaintiff
submits that the classification of an easement is also a conclusion of law. A trial
court's conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness, and no particular
deference is accorded to them. Orton v. Carter. 970 P.2d 1254,1256 (Utah
1998).

CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
There are no controlling constitutional provisions, statutes or rules.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff filed suit to enforce an express 60-foot easement across the
westerly boundary of Defendants' residential real property. Plaintiff also sought to
establish the easement by prescription. Defendants claimed that the reservation
of the 60-foot easement by Plaintiffs predecessor did not create a valid
easement, and denied the existence of any easement by prescription.
The trial court ruled, via pre-trial partial summary judgment, that the
reservation of the 60-foot easement by Plaintiffs predecessor did not create a
valid easement, and that the transfer of the 60-foot easement to Plaintiff was
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therefore ineffectual.
After a bench trial, the trial court ruled that Plaintiff had a valid 16.5-foot
easement by prescription across Defendants' residential lot.
Defendants appealed, not by challenging the existence of the prescriptive
easement, but only by claiming that Plaintiff is not an abutting landowner who can
utilize the prescriptive easement.
Plaintiff cross-appealed, contesting the trial court's rulings as to the 60-foot
easement.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Plaintiff owns real property that lies to the north of Defendants'

residential real property ("Lot 32"). R. at 825, Finding #13. A survey map of the
area is included in the Addendum at Item A. Plaintiffs real property is identified
on the survey map as K-19-8 Annex.
2.

Lot 32 was originally created in 1971 by Kanab Creek Ranchos, Inc.

("KCRI"), a corporate developer, as part of Kanab Creek Ranchos Subdivision
Unit 1. R. at 826, Finding #8.
3.

KCRI transferred Lot 32 to Wayne and Sharon Weaver via Warranty

Deed dated March 1,1977. The Warranty Deed, a copy of which is included in
the Addendum at Item B, included this language: "Subject to a sixty (60) foot wide
roadway easement along the West boundary". The Warranty Deed was recorded
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on March 2,1977. R. at 822, Findings #29 and #30, and Addendum Item B.
4.

At the time of the Warranty Deed and reservation, KCRI did not have

any ownership interest in the real property n i im nmlh m I ol M and never
obtained any ownership interest in that property. R. at 802, Finding #1.
5.

Defendants acquired Lot 32 at a foreclosure sale, via Trustee's Deed

dated February 12, 1990. R. at 826, Finding #7.
6.

KCRI transferred the 60-foot easement to Plaintiff via Quit-Claim

Deed in 1996. R. at 801, Conclusion #1.
7.

In 1997, Plaintiff acquired an undivided one-half interest in lie

westerly 60 feel I |f,f M,' liml slii| immediately north of Lot 32. R. at 820,
Finding #37, Addendum at F.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I. Having acquired an undivided one-half interest in the westerly 60
feet of the 50-foot strip immediately north of Lot 32, Plaintiff is an abutting
landowner.
POINT II. The reservation of the 60-foot easement by KCRI in the March
1,1977 Warranty Deed created a valid easement.
POINT III

I hr.- IMI•',-.(<• i MI Hi. hi I fool. 'dsement from KCRI to Plaintiff in

1996 was also valid.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
HAVING ACQUIRED AN UNDIVIDED ONE-HALF INTEREST IN THE
WESTERLY 60 FEET OF THE 50-FOOT STRIP IMMEDIATELY NORTH OF
LOT 32, PLAINTIFF IS AN ABUTTING LANDOWNER
Defendants' argue that Plaintiffs property does not abut the prescriptive
easement, and that the trial court therefore erred in decreeing the prescriptive
easement in favor of the Plaintiff. Without conceding that abutment is required.
Defendant submits that it is an abutting landowner. On May 22,1997, Garkane
Power Association, Inc., granted Plaintiff an undivided one-half interest in the
west 60 feet of the 50-foot strip immediately north of Lot 32. See Addendum at F.
This act made Plaintiff an abutting landowner. See R. at 820, Finding #37; R. at
825, Finding #13; and Rosenberg Associates' Survey Map at Addendum A.
The cases cited in Defendants' Brief do not support Defendants' specific
position in this appeal. In Farnsworth v. Soter's Inc.. 468 P.2d 372 (Utah 1970),
both the trial court and the majority of the Supreme Court determined that
Plaintiffs' property never abutted the abandoned county roadway. In Mawson v.
J. G. Investment Co.. 464 P.2d 595 (Utah 1970), both the trial court and the
majority of the Supreme Court ruled that Plaintiffs use of his undivided one-fifth
interest in the roadway was limited to those lots he owned along the roadway,
and that he could not use the roadway to access subsequently acquired property
which never did abut the roadway. In the present case, however, abutment
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OCCIII red when

Plaintiff acquired the one-half interest in the westerly 60 feet of the

50-foot strip. Wood v. Ashbv, 253 P.2d 351 (Utah 1952), by its own terms, does
not address the issue before this Court. In Wood, an ingress/egress easement
had been reserved across Wood's property in an identifiable location. The
Supreme Court noted:
The question raised by this assignment, it should be noted, is not
whether Christensen, should he secure access thereto, may use the
decreed restricted way for ingress and egress. Indeed [Wood]
indicates in his brief that he would have no objection to his doing so.
Rather, Christensen (Ashby's successor) sought to obtain a separate
access across Wood's property. Both the trial couii mil n*' Supieme i nmi MIIK!
thai Chrisiensen was nni entitled to the additional access.
To the extent that Plaintiff here is required to be an abutting landowner, he
became an abutting landowner by acquisition of the one-half undivided interest in
the westerly i ii l IM-M I H IIHJ SO-fool snip

POINT II
THE RESERVATION OF THE 60-FOOT EASEMENT BY KCRI IN THE
MARCH 1, 1977 WARRANTY DEED CREATED A VALID EASEMENT
In Utah, an easement may be created by agreement between two parties
through an express reservation. Potter v. Chadaz. fl8 I < > create a valid
easemenl by reservation, the language in the subject document must show the
intention to create an easement, and must be certain and definite. Id. at ^9. The
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language in the March 1, 1977 Warranty Deed from KCRI to the Weavers is
sufficient to create a valid easement. Both the intent to create the easement, and
the location of the easement, are set forth in the simple but clear language,
"Subject to a sixty (60) foot wide roadway easement along the West boundary" of
Lot 32, Kanab Creek Ranchos Subdivision Unit 1.
The trial court, as indicated in the findings of fact drafted by Mr.
Mackelprang (R. at 802), incorrectly ruled that the reservation did not create a
valid easement because KCRI did not own the property to the north of Lot 32 at
the time of the reservation.
However, ownership of an abutting dominant estate is not required to
create a valid easement. While an appurtenant easement is "incapable of
existence separate from the particular land to which it is annexed," an easement
in gross "is not tied to any particular piece of land." Johnson v. Hiqlev, 1999 UT
App 278,1J13, 989 P.2d 61. Where the parties claiming an easement did not own
real property adjoining the land over which the easement was claimed, the Utah
Supreme Court has stated that the easement is an easement in gross. Crane v.
Crane. 683 P.2d 1062,1064 (Utah 1984). Finally, "[t]he primary distinction
between an easement in gross and an easement appurtenant is that in the latter
there is, and in the former there is not, a dominant estate to which the easement
is attached." Nelson v. Johnson. 679 P.2d 662, 664 (Idaho 1984). In this case,
the March 1,1977 Warranty Deed reserved a valid easement in gross to KCRI.
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POINT III
THE TRANSFER OF THE 60-FOOT EASEMENT
FROM KCRI TO PLAINTIFF IN 1996 WAS ALSO VALID
There are two types of easements in gross - personal easements in gross,
and commercial easements in gross. Although personal easements in gross
cannot be transferred, commercial easement, m UIDSS "have been held
transferable almost without exception from early times." Johnson v. Hiqiev, TJ15.
An easement in gross is commercial in nature when its authorized use "results
primarily in economic benefit rather than personal satisfaction." Id a\ tf15.
In the present case, the trial court recognized that KCRI's reservation was an
attempt to provide better access to the property north of Lot 32 in the event that
KCRI should ever acquire that property. R. at 821, 822, Findings #29
was not retainei II

In M •• i H ises as "aesthetics, a hobby, or personal

recreation." ]d. atfl16.

CONCLUSION
The decree of the trial court quieting title in a 16.5-foot prescriptive
easement in favor Plaintiff should be affirmed. However, the decisions of the trial
court, as to the invalidity «.l II i.; uealnni and transfer of the 60-foot easement,
should be reversed.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 26th day of March, 2001.

COLIN R. WINCHESTER
Attorney for Appellee / Cross-Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing Initial Brief of Appellee /
Cross-Appellant were mailed byfirstclass mail this 26th day of March, 2001 to:
VAN MACKELPRANG
328 W. Kanab Creek Drive
Kanab, Utah 84741
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ADDENDUM

Item

Description

Record Location

A

Survey Map

B

Warranty Deed from KCRI

C

Order, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law

800 to 803

D

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and

811 to 828

Judgment Quieting Title
E

Order Denying Motions for New Trial

F

Quitclaim Deed (from Garkane to Plaintiff)
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25 W. Kanab Creek Dr.
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# of County of
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WAXNE WEAVER and SIIARCH K. WEAVER, Husband and Wife, Joint Tcnonto v i t h F a l l
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Grantee
tor the sum of
DOLLARS,
County,
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The officers who aim this deed hereby certify that this deed and the transfer repreiented
thereby was duly aulhorited under a resolution duly adopted by the board of directors of the grantor
at a lawful meeting duly held and attended by a quorum.
In witness whereof, the grantor has caused Us corporate name and if ul In be hereunto affixed
by Its duly authorized officers this
first
day of
March
A. D., 19 77 ,

Attest:

|K/WAB CREEK HAHCIJDO, BfC,

nr
Secretary.
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Company
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Kane

•ts
"• '• T?9.U»e
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Marcli
, A. D. 1977
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Dale E. Clark noil
nnd n i l l i p R« Onolgrotc
who belnr by me duly iwoin did aay, each for himself, that he, the laid
D*lii E« C l a i k i o a
Is the president, and he, the said
P h i l i p R. Onelgrov*
Is the iccrcUry
of
Kanab Cretk Ranchos, I n c .
Company, and that tha within and foregoing
Initrument was aljned In behalf of ttid corporation by authority ot a resolution ol Its board of dlroctort and aald
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VAN MACKELPRANG (5996)
MICHAEL W.PARK (2516)
THE PARK FIRM, P.C.
376 E. Sunland Dr., #1
P.O. Box 2438
St. George, UT 84771
Telephone: (435) 673-8689

FILED
KANE COUMTV

DEC 2 3 1998

FILED
KAMF COUNTV

D |QA

Clerk
SIXTH DISTRICT C O U ^ T H

o/fetft

DISTRICT

ClerK
COURT

DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
KANE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ALVEY DEVELOPMENT CORP.,
Plaintiff,

vs.
VAN AND JAMIE RAE MACKELPRANG,
KANAB CREEK RANCHOS, INC.,
And JOHN DOES 1-10,

ORDER, FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Defendant(s).
VAN AND JAMIE RAE MACKELPRANG,
Counter-Claimant(s),

Judge K.L. Mclff

vs.
ALVEY DEVELOPMENT CORP.,
Case No. 960600070
Counter-Claim Defendant(s).

THIS MATTER having come before the Court on July 10, 1998, pursuant to the
parties respective Motion's tor Partial Siimmaiy .Judgements, the Honorable K.L. Mclff,
District Court Judge, presiding. The Cross-Claimant Jamie Mackelprang was not present

but was represented personally by attorney Van Mackelprang and Plaintiff LaDell Alvey
was present personally and was represented by attorney Todd Macfarlane. The court,
heard statements, and argument(s) from counsel. The Court, being fully advised in the
premises, having considered pending motions, statements and arguments of counsel, and
for good cause shown, hereby finds that the following are undisputed facts:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. The Court Finds that the undisputed evidence is that the attempted
reservation of the of the sixty (60) foot easement arose from the conveyance of lot 32,
subsequent to the plating and subdivision effort. That at the time of the attempted
reservation the grantors who attempted to reserve the sixty (60) foot easement did not
have an ownership interest in the land to the North or the property referred to as the
"Jameson " property. The Court finds that the attempted reservation of said easement
was not for the benefit of the land North or the subdivision and that in either event it
could have been shown on the plat map. The Court finds that it was created solely for
the benefit of creating a situation which would give Clarkson and Snelgrove a position
of leverage in the property to the North and which could not be utilized by anyone but
said defendants and the legal effect of the attempted reservation is null and void. It did
not create an appurtenant easement, nor did it create an easement in gross, because it
had nothing to attach and could not be utilized in any meaningful way. The only
meaningful way it could be utilized was by acquiring the property northward, which said
defendants did not own and still do not own.
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n

ORDER AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I

^101 in II ie loieyoinq i indinqs ol Fact the Court, concludes that said reservation

did not create an easement or right and that the Quit-claim deed to Alvey in 1996,
passed no right. The Court Concludes tl tat it was r lot possible foi defendants to elevate
the easement to a higher level than when they attempted to created it.
Due to the fact that the Court has concluded that the attempted reserved
easement is a legal nullity, the Court does not need reach a legal conclusion in
response to the protective covenants. The Court will not resolve all the issues
concerning the restrictive covet lai its ai id considers those issues still open and does not
need to resolve them, because of the way the court has ruled on the sixty (60) foot
claim of reservation.
DATED this

j
day of December, 1998.
BY THE COURT

K.L
District Court Judge

APPROVED AS TO FORM & CONTENT:

COLIN R. WINCHESTER
Attorney for Alvey Development Corp.

d

VAN MACKELPRANG
Attorney for Litigants Mackelprang
3

CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true, full and correct copy of the foregoing document
was hand delivered, on the £g£"aay of December, 1998, to:
Attorney for Alvey Development Corp.
COLIN R. WINCHESTER.
76 North Main St.
Kanab, UT. 84741.

/h

Y)^(^\

Van Mackelprang
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COLIN R. WINCHESTER [4696]
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF
34 North Main Street
Kanab, Utah 84741
Telephone: (801) 644-5278
Facsimile: (801) 644-8156

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR KANE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

ALVEY DEVELOPMENT CORP.,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND
JUDGMENT QUIETING TITLE

v.
Case No. 960600070
VAN MACKELPRANG, et. al.,
ASSIGNED JUDGE: K. L. McIFF
Defendants.

This matter came before the Court for bench trial on July
20, 1998, pursuant to the claims and counterclaims of the
respective parties, Judge K. L. Mclff, District Court Judge,
presiding.

Following the trial, and after hearing testimony,

receiving evidence, and hearing arguments from counsel, the Court
made findings and rulings from the bench.

The Court requested

that Plaintiffs' then counsel, Todd Macfarlane, prepare written
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and a Judgment Quieting
Title.
Mr. Macfarlane prepared a document that included findings,
conclusions, and a judgment, and Defendants filed certain
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objections thereto.

Those objections came before the Court for

decision on December 23, 1998.

Plaintiff LaDell Alvey was

present, and was represented by new counsel for all Plaintiffs,
Colin R. Winchester.

Defendant Van Mackelprang was present, both

in an individual capacity, and as counsel for all Defendants.
The Court reviewed the objections, and ordered specified changes
to the proposed Judgment Quieting Title submitted by Mr.
Macfarlane.

Based on the foregoing, the Court now enters the

following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiff, Alvey Development Corporation, ("Alvey

Development"), owns property located in Kanab, Kane County, Utah,
which is more particularly described as follows:
BEGINNING at a point 327.81 feet North and 0.91 feet
West of the quarter Section Corner common to Section 32
and 33, Township 43 South, Range 6 West, Salt Lake Base
& Meridian; which point lies on the section line
between said section, and running thence East 255.39
feet; thence North 0°06' West 50 feet; thence East
576.04 feet; thence North 0°06' West 1577.9 feet;
thence North 88°54,44" West 832.86 feet; thence South
0°09'33" East 1612 feet to beginning.
2.

Alvey Development acquired the subject property from

Garkane Power Association by deed dated November 3, 1987.
3.

Garkane Power Association acquired the subject

property, including the above-described Alvey parcel, as part of
a larger 50-acre parcel from Afton Jameson, by deed dated
November 21, 1986.
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4.

Jameson and her late husband, Karl Jameson, acquired

the above-described parcel from Sytha Church by deed dated
October 11, 1958.
5.

Prior to Jamesons, the subject property belonged to the

Church family, including Jack and Sytha Church, since at least
1939.
6.

Defendants Van and Jamie Mackelprang likewise own

property located in Kanab, Kane County, Utah, hereafter referred
to as the "Mackelprang Property", or "Lot 32", which is more
particularly described as follows:
ALL OF LOT 32, TRACT S 34, UNIT 1, KANAB CREEK RANCHOS
SUBDIVISION, according to the official plat thereof on
file in the office of the County Recorder of Kane
County, State of Utah.
7.

Mackelprangs acquired their property at foreclosure

sale, by Trustee's Deed dated February 12, 1990.
8.

Prior to Mackelprangs' acquisition of Lot 32, the

property now constituting Lot 32 had been subdivided in 1971 by
Kanab Creek Ranchos, Inc., (hereinafter referred to as "KCR") a
corporate developer whose primary principals include Dale
Clarkson and Philip Snelgrove.
9.

KCR acquired the subject property, including what is

now Lot 32, from Kenyon and Anna May Little, by deed dated July
23, 1970, as part of a larger 10-acre parcel.
10.

Littles acquired the subject 10-acre parcel from Mrs.

Little's father, Clair Ford, by deed dated August 5, 1964.
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11.

Although the "Little/Ford" property had been owned by

Clair Ford's father, John, for many years, Clair Ford acquired
the subject property by redeeming it following Tax Sale, by Tax
Deed dated May 31, 1957.
12.

Lot 32 is located entirely within the 10-acre parcel

that constitutes the Little/Ford property.
13.

The subject Alvey property adjoins the subject

Mackelprang property, as more fully shown on the survey plat
prepared by Rosenberg & Associates dated January 24, 1997, with
the Alvey property on the north, and Lot 3 2 on the south.

A copy

of such survey is attached hereto as Exhibit "A", and
incorporated herein by this reference.
14.

The subject properties are divided by a fence running

between, which has been in place in the same location, since at
least 1958.
15.

The fence includes a gate between the respective

properties, approximately 14 feet in width, which is located
approximately 25 feet east of the northwesterly corner of Lot 32,
as depicted in Exhibit "A".
16.

The gate has been in the same location, in the fence,

since at least 1958, when the Alvey property was owned by the
Jameson family, and the Mackelprang property was owned by
Ford(s).
17.

According to the evidence presented at trial, dating

back at least as early as the 193 0s, there was an access road
along the west side of Kanab Creek, which crossed both the Alvey
4

and Mackelprang properties, and passed through the gate in the
fence dividing the two properties.
18.

Although such road and gate were accessible

periodically from Kanab on the north, based on varying conditions
of Kanab Creek, it was more readily accessible from the south,
where there were several more reliable creek crossings, near the
location of the present Kanab Airport.
19.

Based on the evidence presented, there has been

continuity of historical agricultural use pre-existing either of
the present parties, going back at least as early as 193 9, but
the primary evidence of such use focused more on the time period
since 1958.
20.

Since at least 1939, however, when the Church family

owned the subject Alvey property, continuing through 1958 when
Jamesons acquired the subject Alvey property, and throughout the
duration of their ownership, the subject Alvey property was
historically used for agricultural purposes.
21.

Although the precise nature of such agriculture use(s),

including livestock numbers, densities, etc., are not entirely
clear based on the evidence presented, such use(s) included
livestock numbers and densities of up to five horses and ten
cows, but often averaged less that that, with an average of three
horses and three cows.
22.

Alveys' predecessors in interest, including Jamesons,

utilized the access across Lot 32 to the Alvey/Jameson property,
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particularly for vehicular access, to tend and care for their
livestock, and engage in agricultural use(s) of the property.
23.

Although it is not possible, based on the evidence

presented, to precisely define the exact extent of the use of the
access across what is now Lot 32, it was used when necessary or
desired by the subject owners, as dictated by their agricultural
needs.

In other words, they used the access easement when

necessary or desirable to tend, care for and use their horses and
livestock.

Such use was regular and constant in the sense that

livestock were usually on the property.

It was sporadic in the

sense that livestock were not always there, and did not always
require exactly the same level of attention, use, or care.

In

addition, not only were livestock kept, and cared for there, but
they were also used on the subject property, for agricultural
purposes, which included recreational horses riding on the
subject and surrounding property.
24.

There were times when such use(s) occurred on a regular

daily basis, and other times when such use(s) occurred on a
weekly or even monthly basis, all according to the need(s) at the
time.
25.

Such uses continued until approximately 1985 when Mr.

Jameson died and the Jamesons established a second residence in
Las Vegas.
26.

By 1985, access to the Alvey property across what is

now Lot 32 had been well established by prescriptive use for a
period well in excess of 20 years, going back as far as 1939.
6

Such use was open, notorious, and adverse.

There is no credible

evidence that the use was ever permissive.
27.

In 1970, when what is now Lot 32 was acquired by KCR,

the access route across the property was open, notorious, and
apparent on the ground.

It had been apparent on the ground for

many years prior to that, dating back to at least 1958 when
Jamesons acquired the subject Alvey property.
28.

The Kanab Creek Ranchos Subdivision was platted in

approximately 1971.
29.

Sometime after the subdivision was platted and

recorded, KCR principals became aware that the access they
witnessed and observed on the ground was apparently the only
reasonable vehicular access to the Jameson property.
Consequently, when KCR sold Lot 3 2 in 1977, it undertook or
attempted to reserve a 60-foot roadway access easement across the
westerly 60-feet of Lot 32, in apparent recognition of the prior
existence of the subject access easement, and based on a
purported desire to provide better access to such property if
they should ever acquire it, and/or provide for better access
planning in the general area.
30.

Consequently, the original conveyance of Lot 32 to its

original owners, Weavers, in 1977, included reference to the
subject 60-foot roadway easement.
31.

KCR did not attempt to create the easement for the

specific benefit of Jamesons, or the Jameson Property.

It did so

because*KCR principals contemplated the possibility of eventually
7

acquiring the Jameson property and because they considered such
access to be consistent with an effort to enhance general
planning for access in the general area.
32.

KCR's attempted reference to and/or attempted creation

of a broader easement, however, did not constitute any form of
permission to use the pre-existing prescriptive easement.
33.

From that time forward, Jamesons had a consciousness of

both sources (i.e., the attempted express easement as well as the
pre-existing prescriptive easement), as a basis for possible
access to their property, and attempted to broaden their
prescriptive access right(s) by attempting to use and take
advantage of the purported express easement, reflected in the
recorded Weaver deed,

Consequently, they notified Weaver's

successor in interest, the Smiths, that they were relying on the
purported 60-foot easement, for access to the property, and that
they claimed a right to use and rely upon the express 60-foot
easement referred to in the Weaver Deed.
34.

Despite such assertion(s), however, Jamesons did not

broaden or increase their actual use of the easement.
35.

In 1986, after Garkane acquired the Jamesons' property,

Garkane designed and built an electrical power transmission line
across the easterly portion of the Jameson property, continuing
to utilize the established access easement across Lot 32, as
necessary for access to their property.

Because of the price

Jameson was asking for the property at the time, which Garkane
found unacceptable, LaDell Alvey who was acting as an independent
8

contractor for Garkane at the time, negotiated an arrangement
with Garkane whereby he would purchase any remaining portion of
the subject Jameson property which Garkane did not need.

Garkane

made that determination in 1987, and deeded the balance of the
subject property, including approximately 3 0 acres, to Alvey
Development.
36.

In the process of deeding and conveying the subject

property to Alvey, Garkane retained a strip along the north side
of the Jameson property and a strip along the south side, to
provide access to its own property across the remaining Alvey
property.

The strip along the south side was designed to reach

and include the 60-foot access easement, across Lot 32, which
Garkane considered at the time to be a valid access easement.
37.

Although there is some discrepancy between the plat

Garkane relied upon at the time of its effort to convey the
subject property to Alveys and the later survey plat prepared by
Rosenburg & Associates, which shows the 50-foot strip running to
the northwest corner of Lot 32 and essentially covering the
entire width of the purported 60-foot roadway easement, any such
discrepancy is irrelevant and immaterial because in 1997, Garkane
conveyed to Alvey Development an undivided one-half interest in
that portion of the Garkane property covering the entire westerly
60-foot wide portion of the 50-foot strip, which resulted in
undisputavle physical abutment between the prescriptive easement
and the Alvey property.
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38.

Such conveyance was in accordance with the

understanding and intention of the parties at the time, Alvey and
Garkane, who intended that they would both have good and
sufficient access to their respective properties, across Lot 32,
from Kanab Creek Drive.
39.

The gate and the fence between the subject properties,

have been in place throughout the entire history evidenced in
this case, at least since 1958 and continuing up to the present.
Although sometimes the gate was closed and sometimes it was open,
the gate always remained in the same location and provided access
to the subject Alvey property.
40.

Although there may have been some slight deviation in

the exact route of the access or approach across Lot 32 to the
gate, for at least 20 years, such access has been located within
the westerly-most 60-feet of what is now Lot 32, always merging
at the gate between the respective properties.
41.

At all times from at least 1958, the use was adverse

and was not permissive.
42.

After Garkane acquired the subject Alvey property in

1986, and Alvey acquired the same in 1987, they continued to use
the subject access easement openly, notoriously, and adversely,
because any previous attempt to create an express easement across
the westerly 60-feet across the westerly 60-feet of Lot 32 was
legally ineffectual and invalid.
43.

Mackelprangs acquired Lot 32 in 1990, when Van

Mackelprang was in law school.
10

44.

Based on its obvious appearance on the ground, and

reference to an easement in the previous chain of title to Lot
32, Mackelprangs had constructive notice and either knew or
should have known that there was at least a possibility of an
easement across the property.
45.

Although Mackelprangs subsequently researched issues

regarding the attempted creation of the express 60 foot roadway
easement, and determined that, in their opinion, it did not
create a valid easement, their conclusions did not affect the
prescriptive easement, and any use thereof following
Mackelprangs1 acquisition of Lot 32 was likewise non-permissive.
46.

Although Mackelprangs may not have observed any use of

the subject access easement after they acquired Lot 32, there has
been some use since their acquisition.

Such uses continued in

the early 1990s, after Mackelprangs acquired Lot 32, but ended in
approximately 1994 when the Mackelprang improvements on Lot 32
became such that it was no longer possible to continue to use the
subject easement without damaging such improvements.
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Defendant(s) Mackelprangs' property, Lot 32, Kanab Creek

Ranchos Subdivision, as more fully described herein is subject to
a valid, legally enforceable prescriptive easement, located
within the westerly 60 feet of such property, established by
open, notorious, and adverse use of the subject easement by Alvey
Development and its predecessors, for the use and benefit of the
adjoining Alvey property, as more fully described herein, for a
period in excess of 20 years, for agricultural purposes.
2.

Any subsequent change of use(s) of the subject property,

by Garkane or Alvey, have been of such short duration that they
have not affected or changed the nature of the historical use of
the subject prescriptive easement.
3.

Although the prescriptive easement at issue is separate

and distinct from any purported attempt to create or reserve any
broader express access easement across the westerly 60 feet of
Lot 32, KCR's attempt to create or convey a valid 60 foot roadway
easement was legally ineffectual.

Although such reference may in

fact constitute an easement in gross, belonging to KCR, and/or
its principals, which is not appurtenant to any other property,
as a personal easement in gross, it cannot be alienated,
assigned, or conveyed to any other party.
4.

Although it is not possible to define the precise

location and route of the subject prescriptive easement, any such
inability has.resulted from Mackelprangs' actions and
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improvements, which have obliterated present signs of the precise
location and route of the subject easement.

Consequently,

Mackelprangs should be estopped from complaining of the exact,
precise location within the 60-feet, because it was their own
acts, placement and improvements in landscaping, etc., that have
obliterated physical signs of the easement and its precise route.
5.

Likewise, because of Mackelprangs' conclusion that the

express easement was invalid, they should also be estopped from
claiming that any continued use of the easement after they
acquired the subject property was not adverse.
6.

Any lapse of time since 1994, the last actual use of the

prescriptive easement, and December 5, 1996, the date of filing
of this action, has been insufficient to extinguish the
prescriptive rights of Alvey Development, because there has not
been any intentional abandonment by Alvey Development.
7.

On the other hand, there has been an intentional

abandonment of such rights by Garkane Power Association, by
virtue of documents it filed with the Court expressly disclaiming
and abandoning any further right or interest to use the subject
property (Lot 32) for access to the Garkane property.
8.

Despite such abandonment by Garkane, however, the Alvey

and Garkane uses of the subject prescriptive easement are
separate and independent, and Garkane's abandonment in no way
affects Alveys1 continued legal right to continue to use and rely
upon the prescriptive easement across Lot 32.
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9.

Consequently, Alvey Development is entitled to a decree

recognizing and quieting title to a valid and legally enforceable
prescriptive easement for the benefit of the following described
property:
BEGINNING at a point 327.81 feet North and 0.91 feet
West of the quarter Section Corner common to Section 32
and 33, Township 43 South, Range 6 West, Salt Lake Base
& Meridian; which point lies on the section line
between said section, and running thence East 255.39
feet; thence North 0°06' West 50 feet; thence East
576.04 feet; thence North 0°06I West 1577.9 feet;
thence North 88°54'44" West 832.86 feet; thence South
0°09 ! 33 n East 1612 feet to beginning.
10.
Lot 32.
ten feet.

Such easement is located within the westerly 60 feet of
If such easement remains unfenced, its width should be
If the easement is fenced, the access lane created by

such fence, if any, should be one rod (i.e., 16.5 feet) in width.
The decision as to whether to fence the easement shall be made by
the Mackelprangs.
11.

Although the Mackelprangs should be entitled to define

the exact location of the easement within the westerly 60-feet of
Lot 32, they should not do so in such a way that does not provide
a reasonably straight access and approach to the gate located
between the respective properties, but otherwise may relocate the
easement anywhere within the westerly 60-feet with sufficient
adjustments for widths and allowances for turns, etc., such that
it may be fully utilized consistent with its historic use(s)
through the subject gate.
12.

Said prescriptive easement may be used to serve the

agricultural purposes of the subject Alvey property, which shall
14

be limited to the nature, scope and extent of historic use, as
reasonably necessary to care for not more than five horses nor
ten head of cattle, with an average of three horses and three
cows, but includes every use that is reasonably necessary or
required to care for, feed, water, use and utilize such livestock
on the subject property, including vehicular transportation to
and from such property.

This statement of limitation should in

no way limit the nature and use of the Alvey property, but only
serves to define limitations on the use of the prescriptive
easement across Lot 32 which provides access to such property.
13.

Alvey Development should also be entitled to maintain

and conduct such reasonable improvements, including but not
limited to grading, drainage, and maintenance of the driving
surface, as may be necessary for reasonable continued use and
utilization of the subject access easement for the defined
historical uses.
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ORDER, JUDGMENT, AND DEGREE
BASED ON THE FOREGOING FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

Plaintiff Alvey Development Corporation is hereby

awarded judgment in the form of a decree quieting title to a
valid, and fully enforceable prescriptive easement 10-feet in
width, or up to 16.5 feet in feet in width if the subject
easement is fenced at the election of the Mackelprangs, located
within the westerly 60-feet of Lot 32, Kanab Creek Ranchos
Subdivision according to the official plat thereof, for the use
and -benefit of the following described property:
BEGINNING at a point 327.81 feet North and 0.91 feet
West of the quarter Section Corner common to Section 32
and 33, Township 43 South, Range 6 West, Salt Lake Base
& Meridian; which point lies on the section line
between said section, and running thence East 255.39
feet; thence North 0 o 06' West 50 feet; thence East
576.04 feet; thence North 0 o 06' West 1577.9 feet;
thence North 88°54»44" West 832.86 feet; thence South
0°09,33" East 1612 feet to beginning.
2.

The subject easement shall be appurtenant to and run

with the subject properties, with Lot 32 fully subject to the
prescriptive easement, as the "servient estate", for the benefit
of the above-described Alvey Property, which is the "dominant
estate".
3.

Use of such easement shall be limited to the historical

nature, extent, burden and scope of use as more fully described
above, together with any reasonable, necessary efforts to improve
and/or maintain the surface to facilitate the utilization
thereof.
16

4.

Subject to the uses and parameters set forth above,

Defendants Mackelprang shall not do anything to thwart,
interfere, or inhibit Plaintiff Alveys1 use and utilization of
the subject easement for the stated purposes.

DATED t h i s

JL
M

CTOBBg^

day of

1999

BY THE COURT:

K. L. M
Distric

V
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on the 24th day of September, 1999, I served
a true and correct unsigned copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT
QUIETING TITLE to each person listed below:
VAN MACKELPRANG
126 East 100 South
Kanab, Utah 84741

(via hand delivery)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on the l$<h day of
H0\f#U*jh^r'
, 1999, I
served a true and correct signed copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT
QUIETING TITLE to each person listed below:
VAN MACKELPRANG
126 East 100 South
Kanab, Utah 84741

(via f-abrot class nfaU)

(JUkl^iyliJ^K
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COLIN R. WINCHESTER [4696]
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF
34 North Main Street
Kanab, Utah 84741
Telephone: (801) 644-5278
Facsimile: (801) 644-8156

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR KANE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

ALVEY DEVELOPMENT CORP.,
ORDER DENYING MOTIONS
FOR NEW TRIAL

Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 960600070
VAN MACKELPRANG, et. al.,
ASSIGNED JUDGE: K. L. McIFF
Defendants.

This matter came before the Court on December 20, 1999,
pursuant to Plaintiff's motion for a new trial and Defendants'
motion for a new trial.
Colin R. Winchester.
Mackelprang.

Plaintiff was represented by counsel,

Defendants were represented by counsel, Van

The parties argued their respective positions.

The

Court had read the parties' various memoranda, heard the parties'
arguments, and was fully advised in the premises.
BASED ON THE FOREGOING, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
DECREED AS FOLLOWS:

6
CL

1.

Plaintiff's motion for a new trial, based on alleged

inconsistencies in the two sets of Findings of Fact, is denied.
The easement is neither a personal easement in gross nor a
commercial easement in gross. Any inconsistency in the two sets
of Findings of Fact on that issue is governed by this Order.
2.

Defendants' motion for a new trial, based on

irregularity in the proceedings and newly discovered evidence, is
denied.

The testimony contained in the affidavits submitted is

not substantial enough to create a reasonable likelihood of a
different result if a new trial were granted.

DATED this

£)

±£i

day of

2000

BY THE COURT:

K. Ti.
McltfF
L. MclfF
District Court Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on the 18th day of September, 2000, I served
a true and correct unsigned copy of the foregoing ORDER DENYING
MOTIONS FOR NEW TRIAL to each person listed below:
VAN MACKELPRANG
126 East 100 South
Kanab, Utah 84741

(via hand delivery)

WI^IAUM

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on the 2/1 ^f day of October, 2000, I served a
true and correct signed copy of the foregoing ORDER DENYING
MOTIONS FOR NEW TRIAL to each person listed below:
VAN MACKELPRANG
126 East 100 South
Kanab, Utah 84741

(via first class mail)

(£t^^^

i,

When recorded, mail to:
Alvey Development Corp.
P.O.'Box417
Kanab, Utah 84741
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GARKANE POWER ASSOCIATION, INC., Grantor, in exchange for good

3

and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged.

I

hereby QUITCLAIMS to ALVEY DEVELOPMENT CORP., whose address is P.O. Box

Lii

417, Kanab, Utah 84741, Grantee, an undivided one-half (1/2) interest in the following

CO

m
%
a.

\

I

1 ig
*- t\ 3

° ol o

described real property situate in Kane County, State of Utah:

cert

Beginning at a point 327.81 feet North and 255.39 feet East of the
Quarter Section Corner common to Sections 32 and 33, Township 43
South, Range 6 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North 0°06f
West 50 feet; thence East 60 feet; thence South 50 feet; thence West
60 feet, to the point of beginning.

a

in <

1 I
cq

WITNESS the hand of said GRANTOR this ^ P ^ d a v of May, 1997.
GARKANE POWER ASSOCIATION, INC.

PEPS
2 J>
U

f /?aj e. Ckujkr

By: Carl R. Albrecht
Its: General Manager
STATE OF UTAH

)
:SS.

COUNTY OF SEVIER

)

On the £LMcL&ay of May, 1997, personally appeared before me Carl R.
Albrecht, the signer of the foregoing Quitclaim Deed, of behalf of Garkane Power
Association Inc., with authority, who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

--NOTARY PliBJJU^

rfJ!

SHELUR.CUR718
176 M. MAM BOX 7M
MCHRBUXUTAHSttOt

COMM. EXP. 10-7-2000
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